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Abstract 
In a growing number of countries, national diplomatic systems are in a process of 
profound transformation as a response to the dynamics of globalisation and 
regionalisation. In this process, a key element of change is that commercial and 
business activities have become foreign policy priority. In order to pursue this priority 
effectively, governments of developed economies have integrated commercial 
diplomacy to their national diplomatic systems by re-arranging their foreign ministries, 
centralising commercial diplomacy or in some cases merging their foreign ministries and 
trade/economic ministries. And although literature on commercial diplomacy of 
competitive economies has found its way into the mainstream of diplomatic studies, 
there is lack of smaller country based studies with regard to how they choose to 
organise their commercial diplomacy. Such national accounts of changing diplomatic 
structures, processes and practices inform well the study of contemporary diplomacy 
and foreign policy. In this light, this article aims to explore the contemporary 
organisational setup of commercial diplomacy in Greece. More specifically, it seeks to 
investigate the structures and processes that Greek governments have put in place for 
the effective conduct of commercial diplomacy in a globalised world and whether the 
Greek case is aligned with mainstream developments in the said area of diplomacy. 
 
Keywords: commercial diplomacy, economic diplomacy, integrated diplomacy, foreign 
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Introduction 
Economic and commercial diplomacy do not constitute a contemporary 
phenomenon, however research especially on the latter is recent (Ruël and 
Zuidem, 2012: 1) and scarce (Kostecki and Olivier Naray, 2007:4). Promoting 
economic interests has always been a key priority for diplomatic missions 
(Coolsaet, 2004: 61). For scholars and practitioners of diplomacy alike, the 
universal recognition that economics lie at the heart of the relations between 
countries has been reflected through changes in diplomacy since the 1970s (Rana, 
2000: 96). In the 1990s commercial diplomacy became central in diplomatic 
discourse with foreign ministries rediscovering its importance. The reasons for the 
growing importance of commercial diplomacy are not hard to find. In the face of 
increasing economic globalisation with its inherent opportunities and threats to the 
markets, governments of strong industrial states wish to encourage their economic 
competitiveness overseas and boost their exports.  
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The combined effects of the economic crisis in Europe and the impressive rise of 
new economies, such as the economies of the 'BRICS'1 countries as well as 
smaller emerging economies, are pushing Western businesses to chase 
locomotives of global growth through exports and investments. The tectonic shift in 
the global economy has translated into a strategic pursuit of commercial interests 
abroad by virtually all Western and most notably European capitals in synergies 
with governments through channels of commercial diplomacy (Frontini, 2013). In 
this climate of increasingly export oriented global value chains, it is not surprising 
that small-sized countries ask the question of whether diplomacy should exclusively 
focus on commerce in order to survive globalisation (Naray, 2008). 
And whilst there is extensive literature on trade and economic diplomacy, far less 
attention has been devoted to commercial diplomacy (Lee and David Hudson, 
2004). This is surprising given that government support for export promotion has 
intensified over the past couple of decades. Arguably, according to Berrige and 
Mercier, there is clearly a need for more research on the topic especially in a 
comparative country case approach (Berrige and James, 2001; Mercier, 2007). 
Evidently, country focused accounts on the management of commercial diplomacy 
inform well the study of contemporary diplomacy in terms of practices, processes 
and structures. This explains why national accounts on the management and 
organisation of commercial diplomacy have found their way into the mainstream of 
diplomatic studies. Yet, there is lack of smaller country/economy based studies with 
regard to the importance they attach to commercial diplomacy and the ways in 
which they choose to organise it.  
Given the need for more country based investigations in commercial diplomacy and 
the lack of research in this field in the case of Greece, this article explores the 
organisation of contemporary Greek commercial diplomacy for purposes of 
contributing to existing literature. With findings that demonstrate alignment of the 
Greek model of commercial diplomacy organisation with those of developed 
economies, this paper presents a recent strategic shift in Greek foreign policy 
making towards policy of economic substance and the prioritisation of supporting 
Greek entrepreneurship abroad for purposes of boosting Greek exports.  
Commercial diplomacy –termed by default economic diplomacy in Greek politico-
diplomatic jargon2- was raised at the top of the agenda of the re-organisation of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and its new Charter in 2007 as part of the 
government’s response to demands imposed by economic globalisation 
(Georgiadou, 2013). The prioritisation of commercial diplomacy in terms of both 
organisation and function, heralded a shift in Greek foreign policy from ‘high politics’ 
towards policy and diplomacy of horizontal economic substance as a result of 
                                                          
1 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
2 In Greek foreign affairs/diplomacy discussions the term ‘economic diplomacy’ is used to refer to 
commercial diplomacy. Based on the above analysis, the usage of the term ‘commercial diplomacy’ 
for those aspects of diplomacy explored in the paper is more appropriate and precise 
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normalization of relations in the post-Cold War era and the development of global 
and regional cooperation in sectoral and economic policies, especially within the 
context of the European Union (Karabarbounis, 2007). More specifically, the 
centralization of the competence of commercial diplomacy in the MFA, heralded a 
turn towards the strategic promotion of Greek business interests overseas and the 
crystallization of a governmental agent, i.e. the MFA, as the primary vehicle in this 
process (Georgiadou, 2013). The changing direction in the MFA’s mission towards 
horizontal economic policies is considered a colossal change which synchronised 
the entire motor of Greek foreign policy making with globalisation. 
Despite the increasing significance attached to commercial diplomacy by Greek 
governments, the study of Greek commercial diplomacy to date has been lacking 
context and relevance with regard to the key themes that preoccupy this stream of 
diplomacy worldwide such as its organisational setup, effectiveness, bureaucratic 
antagonism and turf wars as well as its impact on the role of diplomat and 
diplomatic training. Besides, if the organisation of commercial diplomacy is 
conclusive of the ways in which governments perceive economic globalisation and 
pursue the promotion of national economic interest, then this study will reflect 
contemporary Greek perceptions of national interest.  
In terms of methodology, this paper investigates the Greek case vis-à-vis the key 
themes that preoccupy commercial diplomacy research agendas as well as against 
Rana’s four models of organising commercial diplomacy explained below (Rana, 
2007). The themes that dominate research in this field involve the ways in which 
governments choose to organise their bureaucratic structures and processes for the 
conduct of commercial diplomacy, the responsible ministry and turf wars between 
more than one ministries. In exploring the Greek case, the article utilises a wealth of 
evidence generated through a range of primary sources, such as official 
documentation, governmental websites and interviews with high ranking officials.  
Official documentation involves publications such as official government reports, the 
diplomatic academy’s magazine and memoranda (available to the author whilst on 
fieldwork). In- depth interviews utilising semi-structured open-ended questions were 
utilised for purposes of generating data to inform the aforementioned areas of 
enquiry and conducted at various overseas missions. Interviews were held at the 
MFA’s headquarters in Athens and more specifically at the General Directorate for 
International Economic Relations (DG-B) and the General Directorate for 
International Development Cooperation (DG-YDAS), at the Economic and 
Commercial Affairs offices in Brussels and New York and the Economic and 
Financial Policy Unit of the Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU in 
Brussels.  
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The growing significance of commercial diplomacy 
In the literature, the terms economic and commercial diplomacy are used 
interchangeably. Even though they both have an overarching economic objective 
(Potter, 2004), economic diplomacy3 is more concerned with international economic 
issues and uses a full range of instruments (Bayne and Stephen Woolcock, 2003) 
whereas commercial diplomacy is much more specific (Ruël and Zuidema, 2012). 
Commercial diplomacy is defined as the application of the tools of diplomacy to help 
bring about specific commercial gains through promoting exports, attracting inward 
investment and preserving outward investment opportunities, and encouraging the 
benefits of technological transfer (Potter, 2004: 55). This does not suggest that 
economic and commercial diplomacy are separate activities; they are irrevocably 
intertwined. Essentially, commercial diplomacy is this part of economic diplomacy, 
which is concerned with economic and commercial policy issues (Berrige and 
James, 2001: 81).4 According to Kostecki and Naray (2007:1), commercial 
diplomacy is a governmental service to the business community which aims at the 
development of socially beneficial international business ventures. 
Commercial diplomacy is a value-creating activity. By value we mean the utility 
combination of benefits delivered to the beneficiaries minus the cost of those benefits to 
business and government with great value-added for its shareholders, that is both 
businesses and governments (Naray, 2012; Kostecki and Naray, 2007). And 
although it is hard, to monetise the direct value added of commercial diplomacy 
empirical research demonstrates that its output is significant for its stakeholders 
(Zuidema and Ruël, 2012). This is further highlighted in the current economic 
climate, whereby commercial diplomacy has become even more intriguing. This is 
because not only does it mitigate market protectionism and government 
interventionism especially problematic in emerging markets which most Western 
businesses wish to enter but functions as an accelerator of business 
internationalisation (Penev at al, 2014). As emerging markets attract Western 
businesses to venture into unknown territories and display domestic markets with 
close business-government ties, successful commercial diplomacy becomes 
instrumental for Western governments and businesses to gain access to these 
markets (Visser and Ruël, 2014). In their value chain model of commercial 
                                                          
3 More specifically, economic diplomacy embraces the whole spectrum of measures from informal 
negotiation and cooperation, through soft types of regulation (such as codes of conduct), to the 
creation and enforcement of binding rules or regimes. In economic diplomacy progress is usually 
made by persuasion and mutual agreement but in many occasions it can become confrontational 
and can go right to the brink of conflict. 
4 Olivier Naray, (2008) defines commercial diplomacy as an activity conducted by state 
representatives with diplomatic status in view of business promotion between a home and a host 
country. It aims at encouraging business development through a series of business promotion and 
facilitation activities; Donna Lee in ‘The Growing Influence of Business in U.K. Diplomacy’, 
International Studies Perspectives (2004) 5, pp. 50-54: 51, uses a broader definition which 
encompasses actors outside the traditional governmental diplomatic channels. More specifically, she 
defines commercial diplomacy as “the work of a network of public and private actors who manage 
commercial relations using diplomatic channels and processes”. 
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diplomacy Kostecki & Naray (2007) define a number of commercial diplomacy 
support activities such as intelligence, networking and public relations, contract 
negotiations, and problem solving as activities of commercial diplomacy that are 
beneficial for stakeholders. Those beneficiaries are largely SMEs, micro companies 
and sole traders who use commercial diplomacy in their first steps of 
internationalisation in the given target market, where the local commercial diplomat 
provides market information, list of potential buyers, distributors, importers or simply 
contacts for more specific information (Ruël, De Boer and Ten Haaf , 2013) 
 
In this light, diplomatic studies literature increasingly emphasises the growing 
importance attached to commercial diplomacy in the context of its changing 
practices and organisation as well as the multiplicity of its stakeholders. The value 
added of commercial diplomacy has been widely acknowledged by governments 
and has thus become the axis in their pursuit of national foreign policy and 
diplomacy. Developed and developing countries alike, mobilize their entire 
diplomatic system in ways that reflect the growing importance of commerce for 
national economies. In fact, in the era of commerce without borders on which 
national prosperity depends, commercial advocacy has been raised, for most 
missions, to their most important and urgent function (US Department report, 1999).  
It is not therefore surprising that overseas diplomatic networks are viewed as the 
ultimate governmental drivers to boosting national economies and commerce and 
attracting investments in order to contribute to the earnings of national treasuries 
(Ruël and Zuidema, 2012; Sanders, 2010).  In this climate, governments worldwide 
mandate their diplomatic missions to intensify their business-assistance functions 
and make commercial diplomacy the epicentre in the reorganisation of their national 
diplomatic systems (Rana, 2007: 67).  
 
Organising commercial diplomacy: moving towards ‘integrated models of 
diplomacy’ 
The impact of increasing economic globalisation and regionalisation on diplomatic 
services, which now focus on increasing export promotion and inward investment 
activities, becomes most evident in the structure of foreign ministries, which 
respond by re-organising themselves along the principle of functionality on top of 
the traditional principle of territoriality (Lee, 20047: 51). And although there are 
different national responses with regards to commercial diplomacy arrangements, 
there are certain themes that dominate the research agenda. Those themes 
concern changing bureaucratic structures, oscillation of the commercial 
competence between ministries, transfer of the competence to the MFA and turf 
wars between more than one ministries (Naray 2008). Many countries, which until 
recently ran parallel commercial services outside their overseas embassies have 
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visualised or already moved towards a model of ‘integrated diplomacy’ with an 
‘integrated foreign service’ in which the competence of economic and commercial 
diplomacy is absorbed by the foreign ministry and its diplomatic service (Rana, 
2000: 96-97). 
Naturally, commercial diplomacy poses challenges not only to foreign ministries but 
also to diplomatic staff. The business world confronts policy makers and diplomats 
with new kinds of issues outside the traditional confines of diplomacy (Rana, 2004: 
69). Such change has transformed the role and mission of diplomats, by rendering 
commercial diplomacy one of their substantive tasks. With diplomatic staff being 
concerned more than ever with a widening range of commercial matters, they now 
assume a role in business intelligence, partner search, promotion of exports and 
business advocacy (Naray, 2008). This phenomenon constitutes a major 
component of integrated diplomacy, which is becoming a trend worldwide (Potter, 
2004: 56).  
In the face of pressures for more commercial diplomacy and in conjunction with it 
becoming key foreign policy priority, national governments have been 
experimenting with a number of strategies in organising this branch of diplomacy. 
Most competitive economies such as North America, Europe, Southern Africa and 
Asia have prioritised commercial diplomacy in their foreign policy (Lee and Hudson, 
2004: 343). In order to pursue effectively this priority, governments have reformed 
their foreign ministry and diplomatic service so that they internalise the function of 
commercial diplomacy. There are about fifteen countries that have merged their 
ministry of foreign affairs with their ministry of trade to create one consolidated 
ministry including Australia, Belgium, Canada and Sweden. Countries such as the 
USA, Germany, UK, Finland, Japan and Singapore have put solid structures in 
place to promote commercial diplomacy. For instance the UK and the Czech 
Republic have created a joint body of the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry 
of trade in order to strengthen and coordinate export promotion (Rana, 2007: 67-68; 
Lee and Hudson, 2004: 343). 
In addition to revamping the structures for the conduct of commercial diplomacy, 
governments have also been diversifying diplomatic training. Economics and 
commerce have become the sine qua non of contemporary diplomatic training. 
Diplomatic academies have made training on commerce and economics 
compulsory to their curricula. However, not all diplomatic circles have welcomed the 
new practices which focus on intense commerce promotion. A number of senior 
diplomatic staff view the penetration of commerce-centred developments as an 
attack upon traditional diplomacy. In some Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) quarters, diplomats feel that they are reduced to “selling socks for Britain” –
that is promoting small business interests rather than negotiating big business deals 
or political matters- with the diplomatic profession being “a profession in peril” (Lee, 
2004: 50).  
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Another element that has also had a huge impact on the processes of diplomacy is 
information technology (IT). The internet has changed the work of diplomats and 
specifically, in the area of commercial diplomacy it has offered many online ways to 
facilitate export endeavours (Kurbalija, 1999). By giving access to information about 
regulations and markets in targeted countries for new investments, IT has become 
a most valuable tool in the hands of governments and businesses alike to intensify 
their efforts for more commercial diplomacy.  
 
Models in organising commercial diplomacy: from integration to competition 
And whilst developments calling for more commercial diplomacy have become a 
key concern for most contemporary states, government responses with regard to its 
organisation vary. In the literature, Rana (2007) distinguishes five different models 
in the organisation of commercial diplomacy.  
Firstly, there is the ‘Unification’ model which is essentially an integrationist 
approach adopted by strong economies such as Australia, Canada and Sweden. In 
this model the foreign ministry has unified the political and economic/commercial 
affairs competences. In organisational terms this has been materialised with the 
addition of a separate commercial/export promotion unit to the traditional diplomatic 
service and the enhanced unifying role of the head of mission. 
Secondly, there is the ‘Part unification’ model. The best example of this is the UK, 
which has created two special units in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office jointly 
with the Department of Trade & Industry, to handle trade and investments. It is 
important here that the units are staffed by a unified diplomatic service which 
embraces both political and economic/commercial functions.  
Thirdly, there is the ‘Third agency’ model, found in Singapore, where the foreign 
ministry keeps out of economic work and external economic affairs are managed by 
the Singapore Trade Board and the Singapore Economic Development Board 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Each board dispatches 
their own representatives at key locations who work closely with diplomatic staff at 
permanent diplomatic missions.  
Fourthly, there is the ‘Competition model’ which reflects a confused situation in 
many countries such as India and Thailand where the foreign ministry and 
economic ministries engage in turf battles over responsibility of export promotion 
and the handling of World Trade Organisation affairs. The consequence of such 
battles is that the diplomatic machine does not make a full contribution to 
advancement of economic and commercial interests.  
Finally, there is the ‘Renunciation’ model where the MFA does not play any role in 
bilateral economic and commercial affairs and hands over the competence to 
another ministry such as in the cases of China and Germany. With the 
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aforementioned developments in mind the following sections will focus on the 
Greek case by firstly exploring the ways in which commercial diplomacy is 
organised and secondly, by relating the Greek approach to contemporary models. 
 
Integrating diplomacy in the MFA: a first step towards a ‘Unification’ model  
Commercial diplomacy — which until recently in Greece has been understood as a 
synonym to economic diplomacy5— had been the ‘Cinderella’ of Greek foreign 
policy prior to 2000, with its management brushed aside to ministries other than the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (Georgiadou, 2013). In early 2000 however, Greek 
economic and commercial diplomacy acquired new momentum in the circles of the 
MFA. This momentum was due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the pressures of 
globalisation on a small economy like Greece brought with it the imperative of 
internationalisation for small and medium Greek enterprises (SMEs) as well as the 
need of gaining market shares in third countries. Secondly, Greek governments 
realised that the national income can be significantly boosted through support of 
exports and investments (Interview, 10). 
Consequently, elevating economic and commercial diplomacy to the top priority of 
Greek foreign policy became the key objective of the government’s strategy to 
boost the Greek economy via re-deploying and re-arranging the Greek diplomatic 
capital. In 2007, economic/commercial diplomacy was proclaimed by the Greek 
government to be the core pillar of Greek foreign policy and thus the pivot in the 
project of transforming and modernising the MFA and Greek international policy.  
The strategy of transforming the MFA, culminating in the 2007 MFA reform Charter 
(Law 3566/2007, art. 14), aspired to achieve a deep macroscopic and strategic 
intersection materialized through the re-organization of the MFA to reflect the 
strategic turn towards economic and commercial diplomacy (Interview 1, Strategic 
Planning). More specifically, the 2007 Charter, which if not anything else, heralded 
an unprecedented attitudinal change, aimed at accomplishing the macro-symbiosis 
of the political and economic diplomatic competences under the aegis of the MFA 
thus representing a shift in the substance of Greek foreign policy from political to 
economic. With a renewed, economic mandate, the MFA became the primary 
governmental vehicle in the management of foreign economic relations and in the 
promotion of Greek business interests overseas (Bakoyianni, 2009).  
 
                                                          
5 It is crucial to clarify that with Greece not being in a position where it can use economic resources 
such as rewards or sanctions internationally in order to promote its foreign policies, the term 
‘economic diplomacy’ becomes rather inappropriate. In reality, the so called Greek economic 
diplomacy is solely focused on the promotion of exports and trade per se in given loci and therefore, 
the term commercial diplomacy is more accurate. Therefore, both its substance and organisation 
focus on commercial diplomacy. 
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In the course of embracing its new functions and performing its renewed role, the 
MFA’s organisational structure was extended to encompass the competence of 
foreign economic and commercial diplomacy. Integrating the economic and 
commercial competence into the MFA’s institutional structure marked a strategy to 
also transform its structure from hierarchical (political) to horizontal/productive 
(economic) (Karabarbounis, 2007: 200). 
 
The new agenda of Greek commercial diplomacy was largely shaped as a 
response to the tectonic shifts of global economy and the changing global value 
chains focused on promoting Greek exports and domestic businesses’ 
internationalisation in emerging markets, attracting foreign investments and 
intensifying diplomatic and business engagement (Interview 2, CFSP Ministry of 
Defence). Most importantly, a key priority communicated from the government to all 
commercial attachés was the intensive support of the booming Greek enterprise in 
the Balkans manifested from the late 1990s onwards and the systematic pursuit of 
business enterprise in Africa with a special emphasis on supporting technology 
related Greek start-ups (Interview 2, Commercial Affairs GrRepEU, 2010).  
The function of economic and commercial diplomacy which had been traditionally 
performed by economic and commercial specialists, graduates of the National 
School of Public Administration (NSPA) staffed the respective economic and 
commercial affairs offices (ECOs). ECOs were attached to the network of Greek 
embassies overseas but before their integration with the MFA in 2002, had 
constituted a distinct bureaucratic section, accountable to the Ministry of Economy 
(MNEC). This effectively meant that commercial diplomacy had formed part of the 
MNEC’s mandate and mission until 2002.  
The competence of commercial diplomacy, was transferred from the MNEC6 to the 
MFA on 1st October 2002. The function was absorbed into the newly formed 
General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and Development 
Cooperation at the MFA (Presidential Decree, 159/2002) comprising General 
Directorate B’ Economic Relations and YDAS-Hellenic Aid and presided over by the 
MFA’s General Secretary for International Economic Relations.7 In this light, Law 
3196/2003 provided that the bureaucratic section of economic and commercial 
attachés, staffing the Economic and Commercial Offices (ECOs) was to be fully 
integrated into the institutional structure of the MFA; a change that was crystallised 
with the 2007 MFA Charter Reform. Four years later, Law 3566/2007 provided for 
the gradual abolition of both the ECOs office and the NSPA feeding institution and 
their replacement by MFA diplomatic staff, trained and groomed at the MFA.  
                                                          
6 The competence of economic diplomacy together with the section of economic and commercial  
attachés previously belonged to the Ministry of Trade. 
7 Alongside the transfer of commercial diplomacy to the MFA another significant institutional 
development was the centralisation of the Development Cooperation pillar under the aegis of the 
MFA in the DG YDAS-Hellenic Aid. 
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Despite enthusiasm on behalf of political leadership over change and adaptation of 
the Greek foreign policy structures in response to the increasing demands for more 
efficient and integrated commercial diplomacy, such change was faced with 
scepticism over the chosen course of action. Yet, Greek officials both at the 
headquarters in Athens and in overseas missions acknowledged that Greek foreign 
policy is in a process of ‘large scale fermentation’ aiming at integrating its 
economic/commercial and political facets. This fermentation, -which was necessary 
and long overdue-, indicates the synchronisation of Greek foreign policy with 
contemporary political and economic developments. 
Nonetheless, this process of integrating the political and commercial facets of 
Greek diplomacy, failed to put an end to the long rooted antagonism between 
Greek ministries such as the MFA, the NSPA and the MNEC8, which battled to gain 
primacy over economic and commercial diplomacy. Turf wars for control over the 
commercial function led to a ‘reform fever’ involving a number of reform proposals 
and battles over decision making between an enthusiastic MFA political leadership 
and a resistant NSPA bureaucracy. Evidently, this led to the paralysis of the newly 
designed commercial function and pathologies in both commercial policy making 
and traditional political diplomacy (Tsardanidis and Elisavet Mysiri: 2013). 
Such battles were mostly due to the abrupt transfer of the commercial function to 
the MFA’s existing structure without any prior institutional adaptation. Not only did 
the transfer cause organisational conflict between MFA traditional diplomats and 
newly transferred commercial diplomats but it also resulted in grey areas of 
competence and jurisdiction at the interface between political and economic 
diplomacy (Sitaras, 2005). Therefore, integration of the two strands of foreign policy 
and diplomacy raised concerns and scepticism over its implications for the efficacy 
of the function of commercial diplomacy and the future of Greek diplomacy.  
Strategically, the transfer of the commercial function to the MFA served the 
government’s dual strategic purpose of transforming the MFA into a productive 
ministry, by enhancing its economic policy-making capacity as well as intensifying 
commercial activity overseas under the MFA’s political and bureaucratic 
leadership9. ‘The rationale of this move was to achieve an osmosis of the political 
and economic/commercial elements in policy making which represent the two 
dimensions of foreign policy making capability of Greece. The merging of the two 
dimensions into a single pillar of representation serves the strategic purpose of 
enhancing Greek foreign policy making capacity’ (Interview 4, Business 
Development, B8 MFA).  
                                                          
8 And prior to this, in the 1990s, between the MFA and the Ministry of Trade, where the ECOs 
belonged initially. 
9 The articulation of the strategic target of this assimilation exemplifies again that the substance of 
the so called foreign economic policy is rather limited to commercial policy  
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The integration of commercial and political diplomacy was perceived as the 
optimum way to improve Greek services to citizens and support to businesses 
engaging in enterprise overseas. The international and domestic financial crises, 
with the latter posing acute pressures to Greek governments and publics, 
necessitated more than ever before the boosting of Greek exports and enterprise 
outside the country for purposes of generating income. Greece has been in an 
urgent search of a ‘force multiplier’ and at the same time a ‘producer of wealth’ to 
contribute to the national economy back home (Bakoyianni, 2009b). 
This urgency had already occurred with the increased demands posed by the 
process of globalisation and regionalisation. These processes, not only expanded 
the geographic scope and reach of Greek international engagement but they also 
brought forward an unprecedented growth in new Greek social, political and most 
importantly economic interests in areas such as Russia, the Middle East and Asia 
as well as within the EU and the southern Balkans, thus necessitating increased 
commercial advocacy overseas. The urgency for increased commercial advocacy 
and support of Greek enterprise can be exemplified by the programme of ‘Go 
International’, an Economic Cooperation Programme jointly run by the Eurobank 
group with the four Greek Export Associations10under the auspices of the MFA (Go-
International, 2015). In the course of this, the MFA has overseen a total of 6.250 
business meetings between 750 participating companies and 356 Greek exporting 
companies from 2011 to 2013 in the Russian Federation, Romania, Serbia and 
Cyprus alone.  
Therefore, when in 2009, Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyianni stated that ‘the 
integration of commercial diplomacy with the MFA reflects a much needed and 
unprecedented intersection in Greek diplomacy, which requires change of mentality 
and close partnership with private businesses with the purpose of providing better 
goods and services to Greek businesses and publics overseas’ (Bakoyianni, 2009b) 
she reflected the Greek government’s transformed conceptualisation of national 
interest and the respective strategy for re-organising Greek foreign policy 
altogether. ‘Such change, modernizing both the MFA and commercial diplomacy, 
was aimed at aligning the MFA with strong economies in ways that reflect global 
trend (Interview 1, Strategic Planning, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Namely, the Panhellenic Exporters’ Association, the Greek International Business Association, the 
Exporters’ Association of Crete and SEV Hellenic Federation of Enterprises 
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The value added of Economic and Commercial Offices  
 
The network of the 52 ECOs11 in 2016 (AGORA portal) attached to the Greek 
embassies has been a major player in the Greek diplomatic network in countries 
with a particular economic and commercial interest for Greece. With their role 
focusing on the systematic monitoring and analysis of economic developments in 
the host countries and on the consultation and support of those parts of the Greek 
government and Greek businesses engaging in businesses overseas, these offices 
have undertaken a very active consultative function and an inter-ministerial 
coordinating role. The section’s main role as described by its staff (Interview 4, 
Business Development, B8 MFA, 2009) is to:  
• monitor the international and local markets in the host country and provide 
information and guidance to Greek governments and businesses on issues 
of sectoral significance 
• draw a yearly course of action and yearly reports and consult the MFA and 
the government on issues of foreign economic and commercial  policy  
• offer guidance, support and coordination to other government departments 
overseas  
• maintain a channel of communication between the HQ and Greek as well as 
foreign businesses and co-decide over business activity and action plans  
• organise exploratory and other business missions to accompany the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Minister and his/her deputy or the minister of economy.  
The ECOs constitute this part of the Greek international bureaucracy, which 
arguably altered the dynamics between the overseas missions and the HQ in that 
they have undertaken an active role both in policy consultation and formulation. 
They see themselves as ‘the nerve endings of the machinery which sends stimuli 
back to the centre’ whilst at the same time they change previous images of the 
diplomatic network of being merely an executive tool (Interview 5, Commercial 
Affairs, COREPER, 2009).  
 
Performance assessment and IT 
 
Another aspect that contributes to the value added of ECOs is that they 
transformed significantly the relationship between the MFA and the rest of the 
Greek public administration in terms of intensifying policy coordination.12 This is 
                                                          
11Their number has varied from 52 in 2009 to 60 in 2010 and to 61 in 2011 indicating the boost of 
commerce and to 52 in 2016 to indicate the reduction of funds allocated to the promotion of 
commercial diplomacy due to the Greek economic crisis. 
12 This is why the abolition of the section of economic and commercial  attachés met with strong 
resistance and disapproval from Greek sectoral parts of the state and Greek businesses 
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because the very purpose of their function lies on coordination, cooperation and 
promotion of close partnership between the MFA, the Greek Chambers of 
Commerce, the Greek Exports Council, the MNEC, the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ministry of Transport and other productive ministries with which they organise joint 
business missions (Interview 6, A6-Middle East section, MFA, 2010). 
ECOs and their commercial diplomats are in constant communication with different 
government departments, non-governmental agents and Greek businesses and 
have learned to play the game of ‘building business networks’ outside the confines 
of Greece. Part of their job is to organise business events, conferences and 
business open days as well as engaging in commercial marketing. The ECOs as a 
bureaucratic section was also the first section of Greek foreign policy bureaucracy13 
to introduce process standardisation in the form of ISO 9001:2000 (Interview 5, 
Commercial Affairs, COREPER, 2009).  
ISO 9001, introduced in 2009, aimed at the standardisation of the Greek 
commercial policy for purposes of ensuring its functional efficiency through yearly 
scheduled plans on economic and sectoral issues and the standardisation of 
internal processes for policy planning and implementation. In other words, ISO 
9001 was meant to standardise the international commercial policy process and to 
assess the quality of performance of the ECOs by assessing their output.  
The course of developments in performance assessment and foreign 
economic/commercial policy process standardisation was completed with the 
launch of the online business portal AGORA14. AGORA offers a wide range of 
information concerning Greek and other economies in the form of research and 
market reports carried out and uploaded by ECO offices worldwide and in 
collaboration with the Greek Commercial Chambers, Greek Export Organisations 
and other bilateral chambers such as the Greek-Arab and the Sino-Greek 
Chambers of Commerce. The information managed by AGORA is accessible to 
Greek and foreign public audiences, a step which heralded the start of a new era in 
the relationship between Greek foreign policy bureaucracy and the public through 
the use of IT (Interview 7, Economic Diplomacy, B1 MFA, 2009 and 2016). It is for 
all the above reasons that the section of commercial diplomats is considered to be 
the most ‘outward’ and ‘up to date’ -with regards to economic globalisation, 
Communication and IT- part of the Greek diplomatic network.  
However, despite the added value of commercial diplomats to the Greek diplomatic 
capital, their performance is sometimes compromised by a general lack of business 
culture in the MFA. This is the by-product of the ongoing ‘Greek security issues’ 
which in practice downgrade the performance of economic and commercial 
diplomacy whilst prioritising traditional, geopolitical foreign policy concerns. 
According to MFA economic diplomats, focusing on international economic policy 
                                                          
13 ISO 9001 was later adopted by Consulates with regards to Schengen processes 
14 AGORA portal, available at {www.agora.mfa.gr} 
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as their counterparts do for instance in New Zealand or the UK is considered to be 
luxury (Sitaras, 2005).  
For Greek diplomats, preoccupation with national security issues constitutes eighty 
percent of their job; a fact with tremendous implications for training, orientation and 
culture (Interview 8, ECO office New York, 2011). Living in the turbulent region of 
the Balkans and being the only EU country with ongoing and unresolved traditional 
security issues, translates into a commercial diplomacy which has as a primary 
objective to strengthen local/regional commercial ties in order to ensure security 
(security first), (Sitaras, 2005). As a result, the job description of commercial 
diplomats is still instilled with strong political elements.  
Another factor, which poses constraints on the intensification of commercial 
diplomacy is limited resources. This problem has been exacerbated due to the 
economic crisis despite the need for more commercial diplomacy as a means of 
exiting the crisis.  Arguably, ‘the budget allocated to economic diplomacy is 
extremely low for a country, which has rendered economic diplomacy the main pillar 
of its foreign policy’. To illustrate this, the Greek yearly budget for 
economic/commercial diplomacy in 2009 was €900,000 for the totality of the 61 
ECOs worldwide when for instance Cyprus allocates €700,000 to their American 
office alone’ (Interview 8, ECO office New York, 2011). This factor alone poses 
serious hindrances to the effective organisation and operation of Greek commercial 
diplomacy.  
Integrating the Diplomatic Academy’s curriculum:  a second step towards 
‘Unification’.  
 
The Diplomatic Academy, established in 1999 operates as an independent 
organisational unit of the MFA accountable to the FM. The main objective of the 
Academy has been to deliver studies and training to MFA’s diplomatic candidates. 
Besides the standard diplomatic education, which is mandatory for all MFA’s 
diplomats (the so-called traditional or political diplomats) the Diplomatic Academy is 
also responsible for delivering life-long professional training by organising seminars 
and training courses for all branches of the MFA but also for professionals of other 
home departments on issues which fall under the competence of international 
policy (Interview 9, Diplomatic Academy, 2009 and 2015). 
The Academy’s curriculum was revised by the 2007 MFA Charter reflecting the 
increasing demands for more effective economic/commercial diplomacy as well as 
the strategic aim of producing a new breed of diplomats, ‘integrated MFA diplomats’ 
to replace the previous two branches of economic specialists (graduates of NSPA) 
and political diplomats (graduates of the MFA’s Diplomatic Academy). The revised 
curriculum added six monthly compulsory modules in foreign economic affairs in an 
attempt to start bridging the gap between the political and economic substance of 
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foreign policy and therefore between political and commercial diplomats. More 
specifically, the economic modules are structured as follows (Interview 9, 
Diplomatic Academy, 2009 and 2015): 
a. International and European economic relations – International and Greek 
Economic Diplomacy 
i. International Political Economy and Greek Economic Diplomacy 
ii. European Union: Internal Market – Sectoral Policies and Common 
Trade Policy 
iii. Issues of Development Cooperation  
b. International Trade System  
i. International Trade and Fiscal System  
ii. Law of international commerce and trade 
iii. Attracting and evaluating business plans 
c. Organisation and Operation of ECOs –Principles of International Marketing, 
Marketing of Greek Exports 
d. Special IT applications  
i. Advanced Communication Services on the Internet  
ii. E-commerce 
 
According to the 2007 MFA Charter, the Diplomatic Academy, as part of its lifelong 
diplomatic training and continuing education for the MFA’s officials, is committed to 
organise every year a series of seminars on  
• Economic Management 
• Consular Affairs 
• Computing  
• Foreign Languages  
The newly added subject areas in the Academy’s revised curriculum, demonstrate 
inter alia, a ‘redesigned’ profile for contemporary Greek diplomats shaped by an 
intense focus on international economic affairs and trade, marketing and E-services 
(Passas, 2005: 368). Such developments add a significant economic/commercial 
dimension to the existing political role of diplomats thus reaffirming Greek 
governments’ strategy to integrate the management of all international policy. To 
this end, the ultimate objective of the Academy’s revised curriculum is to provide 
the platform whereby an integrated approach to educating diplomats will result into 
the integrated practice of diplomacy (Interview 9, Diplomatic Academy, 2009 and 
2015). 
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A step too far? Moving back to a ‘Competitive’ model? 
 
Despite triumphant announcements, a wealth of reforms and -at least partly- 
enthusiasm over the unification of the two branches of diplomacy under the roof of 
the MFA, the organisational setup of commercial diplomacy proved rather volatile. 
MFA diplomats dismissed the proposed changes and reforms and ECO diplomats 
were distraught with the abolition of their bureaucratic sector. In this climate, in 
2012, the Greek government resurfaced the issue of re-organising economic and 
commercial diplomacy on the basis of recommendations made by Task Force for 
Greece (Task Force Greece report).  
 
Led by Dutch specialists, the Task Force for Greece, is a European Commission 
administration resource at the disposal of the Greek authorities aimed at addressing 
the institutional barriers to Greek commerce and exports policy posed by the 
economic crisis and to provide assistance to Greek authorities in shaping Greece's 
Export Promotion Strategy (Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2012). In the 
context of this consultation, the team of experts advocated in favour of increasing 
the focus on commercial diplomacy and business support through a different route. 
This should be achieved inter alia, by merging commercial and trade activities 
undertaken by the MFA and the Ministry of Development (MDev) providing for a 
sustainable infrastructure for collaboration between all stakeholders involved in 
commercial diplomacy, trade and investment promotion.   
 
Organisationally, this would translate into the transfer of the competence of 
economic and commercial diplomacy this time to the MDev thus promoting the 
disintegration of diplomacy into two distinct parts; a political and a commercial. On 
9th January 2013, the Minister of Development announced that the competence for 
commercial diplomacy together with the respective ECOs would be transferred to 
the MDev. This reform aimed at manning the creation of a new governmental actor, 
under the aegis of the MDev, focusing on ‘outward business orientation’ and 
commerce boosting, which would absorb the existing Greek Organisation of 
External Trade (Naftemporiki, 2016). Naturally, such institutional initiative, would 
result in the abolition of the MFA’s General Secretariat of International Economic 
Relations, including the entire structure of the Directorate General B: Economic 
Affairs (see Appendix I). 
 
The Task Force’s proposal was due to the MFA’s hitherto observed failure in 
integrating the two facets of diplomacy and boosting commercial diplomacy 
outputs. The Dutch report acknowledged the prevalence and persistence of a 
competitive organisational and professional culture between political and 
economic/commercial diplomacy functioning at the expense of the intended 
integration. As a result, the proclaimed ‘osmosis’ did not reach the expected levels 
and the diplomatic machine did not make a full contribution to advancement of 
economic and commercial interests.  
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Despite the above recommendation, currently, the competence of commercial 
diplomacy remains under the aegis of the MFA. According to senior political and 
commercial officials, 2015 and 2016 have seen this integration model succeeding 
for the first time, with the MFA’s commercial diplomacy outputs increasing. This 
translates into the MFA’s commercial diplomats processing successfully business 
support requests overseas which have risen from 4,939 in 2007 to 14,964 in 2013 
(Interview 10, Business Development, B8, MFA, 2016).  
With the moto export or die (Economic and Commercial Offices Memorandum, 
2013), commercial diplomats present their position on the future of Greek 
international policy and diplomacy, which they see as a one way to survival and 
exiting the economic crisis. To serve this purpose, their value added should be 
taken into consideration in economic and commercial policy planning in the future 
and their integration with the MFA should be given time to settle.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This article explored the under-studied area of Greek commercial diplomacy 
processes and organisation aiming at contributing to the scholarship of smaller 
country based studies in commercial diplomacy. The present investigation 
presented a wealth of primary data demonstrating that Greece follows the patterns 
observed in developed economies, which have prioritised commercial diplomacy in 
their foreign policy agenda, re-arranged their foreign ministries and overseas 
networks of representation to accommodate commercial diplomacy and integrated it 
in their national diplomatic systems. In this respect, Greece is aligned with 
mainstream developments in the said area of diplomacy. 
The Greek case accords with diplomatic studies literature, in that commercial 
diplomacy has become a central theme in Greek governments’ pursuit of national 
foreign policy and diplomacy, which is reflected through the re-organisation of the 
MFA and the mobilisation of the entire diplomatic system, supported by the 
coherent MFA reform package of 2007. By raising commercial diplomacy to one of 
their most important and urgent MFA function, Greek governments demonstrate 
that they are in search of the optimum strategy to responding to the era of 
commerce without borders, on which national prosperity depends whilst at the 
same time,  they are seeking a viable external policy to boost national economy. 
This, inter alia, provides evidence of a re-conceptualised Greek national interest, 
beyond traditional security geopolitical concerns which focuses on boosting Greek 
exports and supporting Greek entrepreneurship overseas. 
In the reconceptualization of Greek national interests lies the realisation that the 
overseas diplomatic network can be a driver to boosting Greek economy and 
commerce, expanding markets and attracting inward investments and 
simultaneously, increasing national income and aiding in overcoming the economic 
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crisis. It was such realisations that drove reforms towards an ‘integrated model’ for 
Greek diplomacy and a modernised MFA organised along the principle of 
functionality presented in Appendix I. It is important to note however, that such 
dramatic shift of emphasis towards commercial diplomacy met with resistance not 
only by traditional political diplomats but also by the fact that unlike in other strong 
economies, in the Greek case political diplomacy revolving around issues of 
geopolitical security has never taken the back seat to allow prominence to 
commercial diplomacy.  
Therefore, in terms of contextualising the Greek case in the widest commercial 
diplomacy literature, it can be argued that at most part it is aligned with strong 
Western economies demonstrating elements of Rana’s Unification model. This 
means that Greece, similarly to Australia, Canada, Sweden and other big 
economies has unified the political and economic/commercial diplomatic 
competences and integrated them within the MFA. In organisational terms this has 
been materialised with the addition of a separate commercial/export promotion unit, 
in this case the ECOs and Directorate General B’ to the traditional diplomatic 
service structure in the MFA. 
At the same time however, it also demonstrates elements of the ‘Competition 
model’ which reflects mostly organisational setups  in developing countries such as 
India and Thailand, where the foreign ministry and economic or other ministries 
engage in turf battles over responsibility of export promotion and commercial 
diplomacy. The consequence of such battles, with the added domination of 
traditional political diplomacy culture is that the diplomatic machine does not make 
a full contribution to the promotion and execution of a coherent commercial 
diplomatic strategy. This has been the case with the ECOs and commercial 
diplomats which have been a ‘nomadic’ branch of Greek diplomacy, moving from 
the Ministry of Trade to the Ministry of Economy in the 1990s, then to the MFA in 
early 2000 and possibly to the Ministry of Development at the close of this decade.  
Therefore, in the spectrum ranging between integrated commercial diplomacy or 
else the ‘Unification model’ and fragmented commercial diplomacy or else the 
‘Competition model’, the Greek case  tilts more towards the former but still 
oscillates between the two.  
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